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762 IN BE CAFFEY 
[Crim. No. 11761. In Bank. June 25, 1968.] 
In re ALGEA CAFFEY on Habeas Corpus. 
[68C.2d 
[1] Habeas Oorpul!-Grounds for Relief-Trial-Violation of De-
fendant's Oonstitutional Rights: Right to Oounsel.-In chal-
lenging two prior convictions charged in connection with a 
California marijuana offense, defendant was entitled to an evi-
dentiary hearing by the sentencing court on the first otherwise 
valid prior conviction, sufficient of itself to justify the imposi-
tion of additional punishment in the California case, on his 
allegations and offer of proof of non-representation by counsel, 
and if found not to have been properly represented by counsel 
thereat, was entitled to a similar hearing on the subsequeqt 
charged prior convietion, and if found to have been properly 
represented thereat, to a determination of the validity of such 
conviction on constitutional grounds, where relief was sought 
by habeas corpus in superior court of the county in which 
petitioner was confined, which properly transferred the matter 
to the sentencing court for hearing. 
[2] Poisons-Offenses and Prosecutions-Oonstitutionality of Stat-
utes.-Although Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 [19 
L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 697], Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 
62 [19 L.Ed.2d 906, 88 S.Ct. 709], and Haynes v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 85 [19 L.Ed.2d 923, 88 S.Ct. 722], involving 
the impact of the Fifth Amendment on federal gambling and 
firearms legislation, cast substantial doubt on the validity of 
convictions for violation of the Marijuana Tax Act (26 U.S.C., 
§ 4741 et seq), they afford no reason to doubt the validity 
of convictions for smuggling marijuana (18 U.S.C., § 545), 
although based on failure to declare and invoice marijuana 
upon importation, as the purpose of the declaration require-
ment is not the harassment of a particular class of persons 
or the obtaining of evidence in order to prosecute them; thus 
a habeas corpus petitioner's 1943 marijuana smuggling convic-
tion under former 19 U.S.C., § 1593b (now 18 U.S.C., § 545), 
did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination. 
[1] See Oal.Jnr.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 90 et seq; Am.Jur., Habeas 
Corpus (1st ed § 147 et seq). 
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, § 29; Am.Jur.2d, Drugs, 
Narcotics, and Poisons, § 35 et seq. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, §§ 30(4), 30(5); 
[2] Poisons, §9.1; [3] Habeas Corpus, §65(4); [4] Criminal Law, 
§l08; [5] Habeas Corpus, §§ 60(3), 61(1); [6] Habeas Corpus, 
§ 30(4). 
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Habeas Corpus-Judgment-Remand.-On a habeas corpus 
proceeding challenging the validity of two charged and admit-
ted prior convictions at which petitioner asserted he was not 
represented by counsel, petitioner was entitled to an eviden-
tiary hearing by the sentencing court, and the matter must be 
remanded to the sentencing court for such hearing and resolu-
tion by it of petitioner's allegations that he was denied the 
right to counsel on a prior otherwise valid conviction, where 
the record in the habeas corpus proceeding disclosed a conflict 
in evidence relating thereto. 
Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Consul-
tation.-The denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to 
confer, to consult with the accused, and to prepare his defense, 
could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and 
nothing more than a formal compliance with the Constitution's 
requirement that an accused be given assistance of counsel. 
Habeas Corpus-Hearing-Burden of Proof-Denial of Right 
to Counsel: Presumptions.-While federal records import a 
presumption that official duty was regularly performed, the 
presumption is not conclusive and will not be invoked to pre-
clude a showing that the record is incomplete or inaccurate; 
thus a habeas corpus petitioner attacking the validity of a 
charged and admitted prior conviction in federal court for 
asserted nonrepresentation by counsel, who made a specific 
offer of reliable proof was entitled to be given the opportunity 
to present testimonial and documentary evidence to sustain 
his burden of disproving facts recited in the record, where 
the record entry that petitioner appeared with counsel at the 
prior conviction did not state when or how counsel was ap-
pointed, nor whether petitioner pleaded guilty with the assist-
~ce of an attorney who was his counsel in fact as well as 
pro forma. 
Id.-Grounds for Relief-Violation of Defendant's Constitu-
tional Rights.-Althongh defendant must ordinarily raise a 
constitutional issue by a pretrial motion to strike a prior con-
viction from an information or indictment, or by entering a 
plea denying the prior conviction, a habeas corpus petitioner's 
failure to pursue such remedies did not constitute a waiver of 
his right to a hearing as to his nonrepresentation by counsel 
at his prior conviction, despite a court record to the contrary, 
where at the time of his California conviction in which the 
prior conviction was charged, it had not judicially been made 
clear that defendant could offer extrinsic evidence to disprm'c 
facts recited in official records of conviction or to prove that 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 157; Am.Jur.2d, Cl"iminal 
Law, §312. ': I 
) 
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an incomplete record masked violation of constitutional rights, 
and where a finding of waiver would unduly restrict the right 
to relief from a substantial increase in punishment based on 
a constitutionally invalid conviction. 
Proceeding in habeas corpus to challenge the validity of 
prior convictions. Writ granted with directions to redeter-
mine sentence. 
Algea Caft'ey, in pro. per., and Earl Klein, under appoint-
ment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Richard H. Cooper, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner is confined in the California 
Men's Colony ·at Los Padres under a judgment of conviction 
of violating Health and Safety Code section 11500 (posses-
sion of heroin) entered upon his plea of guilty in the San 
Francisco Superior Court on February 18, 1959. He admitted 
two prior federal narcotics convictions, and the court. sen-
tenced him to imprisonment for not less than two nor more 
than twenty years (former Health & Saf. Code, § 11712).1 In 
this habeas' cc:irpus proceeding he challenges the validity of 
his prior convictions. I 
Petitioner's first prior conviction was entered on June 30, 
1943, in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Texas upon his plea of guilty to the charges of 
unlawful importation of marijuana into the United States 
without paying the annual registration tax (former 26 U.S.C. 
§ 3234(a), now § 4755(a», unlawful acquisition of marijuana 
without paying the transfer tax (former 26 U.S.C. § 2593(a), 
now § 4744),2 and unlawful concealment and transportation 
of marijuana after importing it without invoice or declara-
l' 'Any person convicted under this division for having in possession 
any narcotic, ••• shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail 
for not more than one year, or in the state prison for not more than 10 
years. If such perSOn has been previously convicted of any offense under 
thr laws .•. of the United States, which if committed in this State 
would have been punishable as an offense described in this division, the 
previous conviction shall be charged • • • and • • • if admitted by the 
defendant, he shall be imprisoned in the state prison for not less than two 
nor more than 20 years." 
2Thcse statutes are part of what is sometimes referred to as the Mari-
juana Tax Act. 
) 
'" 
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tion (former 19 U.S.C. § 1593(b), now 18 U.S.C. § 545). 
Petitioner's second prior conviction was also for unlawful 
acquisition of marijuana wihout paying the transfer tax. It 
was entered on April 19, 1950, upon his plea of guilty in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. 
The records of the federal courts state that petitioner 
appeared with counsel at the proceedings in 1943 and 1950. 
Petitioner alleges and offers to prove, however, that if coun-
sel appeared for him in either proceeding, the appearance 
was a mere formality and that he was therefore denied the 
right to effective legal representation. Petitioner first applied 
for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of San 
Luis Obispo County. On June 23, 1967, that court ordered 
that petitioner be returned to the San Francisco Superior 
Court for an evidentiary hearing on the validity of the prior 
convictions. (See In re Woods (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 3, 11 [48 
Cal.Rptr. 689, 409 P.2d 913] ; In re Luce (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 
11,14 [48 Cal.Rptr. 694,409 P.2d 918]; In re Tucker (1966) 
64 Cal.2d 15, 21 [48 Cal.Rptr. 697, 409 P.2d 921].) On 
August 24, 1967, the San Francisco Superior Court ordered 
that petitioner be returned to San Luis Obispo County "for 
further hearing." On September 15, 1967, the superior court 
of that county denied the petition on the basis of the records 
in the federal courts. Neither court held an evidentiary hear-
ing.a 
We issued an order to show cause why petitioner should 
not have an opportunity in an evidentiary hearing to prove 
that his prior convictions were obtained in violation of his 
aWe note at the outset that petitioner properly applied for the writ in 
the court of the county in which he was confined, San Luis Obispo. Pur· 
suant to our decisions in the Woods, Luce, and Tucker eases that court 
properly ordered the venue ehanged to the San Francisco Superior Court, 
the sentencing court, when it appeared that facts were alleged that, if 
true, would require resentencing. (Cf. Code Civ. Proc., § 397, subd. 1; 
28 U.S.C. § 224I(d).) The San Francisco Superior Court declined to 
entertain the proceeding, apparently on the erroneous ground that the 
San Luis Obispo Superior Court had no power to transfer the proceeding. 
The sentencing court, however, must respect a transfer of a habeas corpus 
proceeding from the superior court having territorial habeas corpus juris-
diction when that cOllrt grants the petition to permit reconsideration of 
the sentence. The sentencing court must conduct an evidentiary hearing 
if it determines that such a hearing is necessary and must redetermine 
the sentence in accordanc with its findings. Its order will be appealable 
as an "order made aiter judgment, affecting the substantial rights '.' of 
the defendant or the People. (Pen. Code, §§ 1237, 1238; cf.People v. 
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right to counsel. He now contends also that he was convicted 
under federal statutes that violate the Fifth Amendment 
guarantee of the privilege against self-incrimination. He 
invokes principles recently anllounced by the United States 
Supreme Court in Marchetti v. United States (1968) 390 
U.S. 39 [19 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 697]; Grosso v. United 
States (1968) 390 U.S. 62 [19 L.Ed.2d 906, 88 S.Ct. 709, 
716J; and Haynes v. Um:ted States (1968) 390 U.S. 85 [19 
L.Ed.2d 923, 88 S.Ct. 722], which involved the impact of the 
Fifth Amendment on federal gambling and firearms legis-
lation. 
\Ve have concluded that petitioner is entitled to a hearing 
to determine whether he was denied the right to counsel at 
the proceeding in 1943. \Ve have also concluded that the 
federal statute (former 19 U.S.C. § 1593(b), now 18 U.S.C. 
§ 545) prohibiting concealment and transportation of mari-
juana imported without invoice or declaration does not vio-
late the Fifth Amendment. If petitioner's right to counsel 
was not violated when he was convicted of violating that 
statute in 1943, that conviction would be a valid prior convic-
tion sufficient to support his sentence under former Health 
and Safety Code section 11712.4 
[1] If the trial court determines that petitioner's right 
to counsel was violated at the 1943 proceeding, it must then 
conduct a hearing on petitioner's allegations that he was 
denied the right to counsel at the 1950 proceeding, when he 
was again convicted of unlawful acquisition of marijuana 
without paying the transfer tax. If the court determines that 
the right was also denied at the 1950 proceeding, it must 
disregard both prior convictions in redetermining petition-
er's sentence. Only if the court finds that petitioner was not 
afforded the right to counsel in the 1943 proceeding, but was 
afforded that right in the 1950 proceeding, will it be neces-
sary to reach the questions whether the federal statute 
prohibiting the unlawful acquisition of marijuana without 
paying the transfer tax violates the Fifth Amendment and 
4This offense would qualify as an "offense under the laws •.. of the 
United States which if committed in this State would have been punish· 
able as all offense described" in division 10 of the Health and Safety 
Code (see former § 11712, now § 11500). The transportation and eon· 
c('almcnt of marijuana ill California is punishable under section 11531. 
See also People v. Machado (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 63, 67 [4 Cal.Rptr. 
110]. Moreover, under former section 11712 one prior conviction was 
sufficient to support a senten~e of imprisonment for not less than two nor 
more than twenty years. (See fn. I, supra.) 
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whether petitioner may properly assert the privilege against 
self·incrimniation on habeas corpus following a plea of guilty 
at triaJ.li Further consideration of the questions relating to 
the validity of the Marijuana Tax Act will therefore be 
deferred until after the determination of the right to counsel 
issue. Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court may llave 
settled the issue as to the validity of that statute in the light 
of the Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes cases.6 
[2] Although tb.se decisions cast substantial doubt on 
the validity of convictions for violations of the Marijuana 
Tax Act (see dissenting opinion of Chief Justice 'Warren, 
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 77, at p. 83 [19 L.Ed.2d at 
p. 917] ), they afford no reason to doubt the validity of eonvie-
IiDefendants in Marchetti v. United States and Haynes v. United States 
asserted the privilege at trial. Defendant in Grosso v. United States 
asserted the privilege at trial as to some but not all of the charges against 
him, but the Supreme Court found no effective waiver of the privilege on 
the ground that its assertion would have been futile under the preexisting 
law. (Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. at pp. 70·71 [19 L.Ed.2d at 
pp. 913·914]; see also Harris v. Vnited States (8th Cir. 1968) 390 
F.2d 616.) 'fhere is no indication, however, whether the Marchetti, 
Grosso, and Haynes cases will be applied to release prisoners whose judg· 
ments of cOll'l"iction had become final at the time of these decisions. Ordi· 
narily, of course, defendants convicted under a statute that is subsc· 
quently declarcd unconstitutional are entitled to release, whether their 
judgments of convictions are final or not. (See Ex parte Siebold (1879) 
100 U.S. 371, 376·377 [25 L.Ed. 717, 719].) When the constitutional 
infirmity depends on its "proper assertion" (see Marchetti v. United 
States, 390 U.S. at p. 42 [19 L.Ed.2d at p. 894]), the result is not 80 
clear. 
6In thesc cases the Supreme Court reversed convictions for failing to 
register and pay the occupational tax for the business of accepting 
wagers (26 U.S.C. §§ 4411, 4412; Marchetti v. United States); for failing 
to pay the excise tax on the gross amount of all wagers acceptcd (26 
U.S.C. § 4401; Grosso v. United States); and for possession of unreg· 
istered firearms (26 U.S.C. §§ 5851, 5841; Haynes v. United States).) 
To comply with these statutes defendants were required to disclose infor. 
mation exposing them to "substantial and' real' •.. bazards of incrim· 
ination" in areas" 'permeated with criminal statutes.' " (Marchetti v. 
United Statcs, 390 U.S. at pp. 53, 47 [19 L.Ed.2d at pp. 901, 897].) The 
court determined that such methods of taxing and regulating unlawful 
activities contravened the Fifth Amendment privilege against self· 
illc.rimination. 
Unitrd States v. Covington (S.D. Ohio 1968) 282 F.Supp. 886, hold· 
ing 26 United States Code section 4744(a) (1) unconstitutional, is the 
only reported decision we have found applying the Marchetti, Grosso, and 
Haynes decisions to the Marijuana Tax Act. 
The United States Supreme Court haa granted certiorari in Leary v. 
United States (5th Cir. 19(7), to consider the ouestion whether thc rcgis· 
tration and tax provisions in 26 United States Code sections 4741 (a), 
4742 and 4744 (a) violate petitioner '8 privilege against self·incrimination 
in the light of the Marchctti, G1'OSSO, :md Haynes eases. (Junc 10, 1968; 
392 IT.S. 903 [:20 L.Ed.2d 1362, 88 S.Ct. 2058].) 
, ' , ~ i 
) 
768 IN BE CAFFEY [68 C.2d 
tions for smuggling marijuana. It is true that petitioner's 
conviction in 1943 for unlawful concealment and transporta-
tion of marijuana rests on his failure to declare and invoice 
it upon importation.7 Such declaration, however, in fact pre-
vents the crime of smuggling from occurring. "The purpose 
of requiring the goods to be declared is to prevent their 
importation or to make sure they are not imported without a 
duty being paid." (Mansfield, '1'he Albertson Cases: Conflict 
Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the 
Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup.Ct.Rev. 103, 
141.) Moreover, declaration of possession of marijuana at the 
port of entry into the United States does not expose the 
declarant to prosecution for untaxed possession within the 
United States under 26 United States Code section 4744 or 
4755. "Had [petitionerJ invoiced tIle marijuana at his first 
opportunity, he would have been relieved of it by the Cus-
toms agents, and thus would not have smuggled it, and 
would not have been in possession of it within the United 
States," (Italics in original. Pickett v. Unite,d States (S.D. 
Cal. 1963) 223 F.Supp. 695, 696, cert. den. (1964) 37!) U.S. 
939 [13 L.Ed.2d 349, 85 S.Ct. 346J (upholding validity of 21 
U.S.C. § 176a, substantially identical with former 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1593 and with 18 U.S.C. § 545) ; Rule v. United States (5th 
Cir. 1966) 362 F.2d 215, 217 (same).) Thus, the "harassment 
of a particular class of persons or the obtaining of evidence 
in order to prosecute them" is not the purpose of the 
declaration requirement. (Mansfield, op. cit. supra, 1966 
Sup.Ct.Rev. at p. 141; see also concurring opinion of Justice 
Brennan, Grosso v. United States, supra, 390 U.S. 72 at p. 73 
718 United States Code section 545 provides: "Whoever knowingly 
and willfully, with intent to defraud the United States, smuggles, or clan· 
destinely introduces into the United States any merchandise wllich should 
have been invoiced, or makes out or passes, or attempts to pass through 
the customhouse any false, forged, or fraudulent invoice, or other docu-
ment or paper; or whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings 
into the United States, any merchandise cont.rary to law, or receives, con-
ceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, con-
cealment, or sale of such merchandise after importation, knowing the 
same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to 
law •.. is subject to the prescribed penalties." . 
The indictment charged that on or about May 24, 1943, petitioner 
"unlawfully concealed and facilitated the transportation Ilnd concealment, 
after importation, of 15 pounds of marijuana, which had been theretofore 
imported into the United States of America from the United States of 
Mexico without the same being invoiced and without proper entry thereof 
being made, and. without declaration thereof being made to any proper 
officer of the Umted Statcs, ... then and there well knowing said mer-
chandise to have been so imported contrary to law at the time • • • [he] 
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tioner's 1943 conviction under former 19 United States Code 
section 1593b did not violate his privilege against self-
inc rim ina tion. 
[3] Whether that conviction properly supports an 
increase in punishment under former Health and Safety 
Code section 11712 therefore turns on the determination of 
the right to counsel issue. 'l'he minutes of the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Texas, El Paso 
Division, state that on June 30, 1943, petitioner and a code-
fendant appeared "each in proper person and by W. H. 
Fryer and Jos. L. Dunigan, their counsel, respectively," and 
pleaded guilty to the charges in the indictment filed June 21, 
1943. Judge Charles A. Boynton then sentenced petitioner to 
four years; imprisonment. The "Memo of Proceedings" for 
the date of trial also contains the notation, "W. H. Fryer, 
Attorney for Caffey." In his return to the order to show 
cause, the Attorney General states that Mr. Fryer is dece~ed 
and Mr. Dunigan has no independent recollection of the case. 
In his verified petition petitioner alleges that he is a Negro 
and that courts in the southern states customarily meted out 
"kangaroo court" justice to Negroes. He offers to prove by 
sworn eyewitness testimony that he first appeared in court on 
June 15, 1943, and pleaded guilty without counsel and with-
out waiving counsel. He alleges that on June 30, 1943, the 
following events occurred: 
"Honorable Judge C. A. Boynton asked Petitioner if he 
had counsel, Petitioner replied he did not have counsel. The 
Judge again asked Petitioner if he was Guilty of the 
Charges, Petitioner replied that he was guilty. . . . The 
Honorable Judge C. A. Boynton then spoke to the Court-
room-Saying, Is there anyone in the Court who will 
volunteer to stand up beside this man while being sentenced' 
At that time an Attorney stood at Petitioner's side, (Un-
doubtedly, it was this Attorney, W. H. Fryer that's referred 
to in the transcript), and sentence was passed. Petitioner did 
not see or talk to any counsel from the time he was arrested, 
or see any counsel during his court appearances, and did not 
talk to the counsel that stood beside him while he was being 
sentenced." (Italics and statement in parentheses are peti-
tioner's.) The truth of these allegations can be determined 
only in an evidentiary hearing . 
• C.Zd~ 
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If petitioner proves that he was denied the right to counsel 
at the 1!)43 proceeding, he is entitled to a hearing on his 
allegations that he was denied the right to counsel at the 
1950 proceeding as well, and that the 1950 conyietion there-
fore cannot support his S(,11tl'nee under former Health and 
Safety Code section 11712. 'rite judgment of the United 
Stntes District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 
Laredo Division, statt's that on April 19, 1950, petitioner 
"appeared in person and with counsel," and pleaded guilty 
to count three of the indictnwnt. On motion of the United 
States Attorney, Judge James V. Allred dismissed counts one 
and two, lind sentenced petitioner on count three to four 
years' imprisonment. The docket entry for that date states 
that petitioner and codefendant Thomas appeared with attor-
neys vV. W. Allen and Jacob Hornberger. 
The Attorney G(>neral has attached to his return the affi-
davit of William 'V. Allen, a Laredo attorney, to which Mr. 
Allen had appended a copy of a letter he wrote Mr. Horn-
berger on April 14, 1%0, to acknowledge receipt of a $100 
retainer in the case of "Pnited States vs. Thomas and 
Caffey," a eopy of an entry for the retainer in his income 
journal for 1%0, and copies of two entries in his 1950 Daily 
Schedule ;Book. An April 17 entry states, "United States vs. 
'l'homfls and Caffey-Federal Court"; an April 19 entry 
states, "United States vs. Thomas and Caffey, 1 :30 p.m., 
Pleas of Guilty." Mr. Allen states in his affidavit that "Mr. 
Hornberger was originally employed and represented either 
one or both of the defendants at the preliminary examination 
and asked me to appear with him in the case at the time of 
entry of the pif'a of guilty .... I reeall talking to the two 
defendants in the detention cell in the Federal Court Build-
ing prior to pleading in Court. . . ." 
The Attorney General also submits with his return an affi-
davit of J ucob IIornbprgPl' sta1 ing that he has no inde-
Pl'UUC'llt recollection of the case. He appended to his affidavit 
II (·opy of a reepipt that Iw :.ra vt' Mrs. Gladys Caffey on April 
14, 1950, for $200 "in full payment of fees for representation 
of A Jg-C'r CHffec~ [sic], and Brewington C. Thomas in Federal 
charge," a telegram dated April 17, 1950, and sent from 
Lufkin Texas, stating': "Be late getting there due to bad 
weather and siekness, but on our way now. Gladys Caffey," 
and the original of the letter he received from Mr. Allen 
aeknowledging reeeipt of the $100 retainer. 
Pe1itioner alleges that Judge Allred scheduled the trial for 
) 
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April 19, 1950, upon petitioner's request that "he would like 
to wait until his wife arrived from California to see if she 
had money to retain counsel for him. . . ." Petitioner's 
wife arrived, but did not have money enough to retain coun-
sel for petitioner. He offers to prove by sworn eyewitness 
testimony that he pleaded to one count of the indictment 
after informing the court that he had no counsel and no 
money to retain one. "Then the Judge asked Petitioner if 
there was anything he wanted to say before sentencing. At 
this time Petitioner's wife asked the Honorable Judge if she 
could. address the Court, which she was permitted to do. She 
asked the Court to show leniency .... The Honorable Judge 
Allred then sentenced Petitioner to four years. Petitioner did 
not have counsel and did not waive counsel. " 
In an affidavit Mrs. Gladys Caffey states that at the time of 
her husband's arrest in 1950 She was residing in Los Angeles 
and that she drove to Laredo to join him at his trial. She 
denies sending a telegram to Mr. Hornberger from Lufkin, 
Texas, stating that Lufkin is near the eastern border of 
Texas and was not on her route from Los Angeles. She denies 
paying Mr. Hornberger $200 to represent her husband. "I 
was present in court with my husband at the time of sentenc-
ing and there was no attorney present representing him or 
who stated anything to the court on his behalf. " 
It is for the sentencing court to resolve the conflict in the 
evidence. That court has not had the benefit of the affidavits 
of Mrs. Caffey, Mr. Hornberger, and Mr. Allen. We must 
therefore remand the case for the trial court's determination 
in the light of these affidavits and any evidence the parties 
might offer in the trial court. 
If true, petitioner's allegations would render the prior 
convictions "devoid of constitutional support." (People v. 
Coffey (1967) 67 Ca1.2d 204, 215 [60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 
P.2d 15].) If no counsel was present at petitioner's court 
appearances and if petitioner did not waive the assistance of 
counsel, the convictions violated the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel that Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458 [82 
L.Ed. 1461, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 146 A.L.R. 357], secured to indi-
gents in federal courts. Nor can the token presence of counsE'1 
that petitioner concedes as to the 1943 conviction satisfy con-
stitutional requirements. [4J "The denial of opportunity 
for appointed counsel to confer, to consult with the accused 
and to prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of 
'\ 
J 
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counsel into a sham and nothing more than a formal compli-
ance with the Constitution's requirement that an accused be 
given the assistance of counsel." (Avery Y. Alabama (1940) 
308 U.S. 444, 446 [84 L.Ed. 377, 379, 60 S.Ct. 321]; see 
Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 53, 71 [77 L.Ed. 158, 
162-163, 171-172, 53 S.Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527] ; In re Newbern 
(1960) 53 Cal.2d 786, 790 [3 Cal.Rptr. 364, 350 P.2d 116] ; 
Von Moltke v. Gillies (1948) 332 U.S. 708, 722-723 [92 L.Ed. 
309, 320-321, 68 S.Ct. 316] ; Jones v. Cunningham (4th Cir. 
1962) 297 F.2d 851, 855.) 
[5] The Attorney General contends that the federal 
records import a presumption that official duty was regularly 
performed (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 15), and that 
petitioner is therefore not entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
on the validity of the prior convictions. The presumption of 
regularity, however, is not a conclusive one·, and we do not 
invoke it to preclude a showing that the record is incomplete 
or inaccurate.8 A docket entry that defendant was" 'duly 
arraigned' " and ", informed ... of his legal rights,'" 
for example, '" does not state how, when or in what man-
ner' " defendant was informed, "nor does it specify which 
of his various rights were thus made known to him." (In re 
Johnson. (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 325, 330-331 [42 Cal.Rptr. 228, 398 
P.2d 420] ; see also In re Smiley (1967) 66 ·Cal.2d 606, 622 
[58 Cal.Rptr. 579, 427 P.2d 179].) Similarly, the recor4 __ 
entry that petitioner appeared with counsel does not state 
when or how counsel was appointed, nor whether petitioner 
pleaded guilty with the assistance of an attorney who' was his 
counsel in fact as well as pro forma. Petitioner has the 
burden of disproving the facts recited in the records. When, 
as here, he makes a specific offer of reliable proof, he "must 
be given the opportunity to present . . . testimonial and 
documentary evidence relevant to the disputed issues." 
(Townsend v. Sain (1963) 372 U.S. 293, 322 [9 L.Ed.2d 770, 
791, 83 S.Ct. 745] ; Wright v. Dickson (9th Cir. 1964) 336 
F.2d 878, 883; see In re Bell (1942) 19 Cal.2d 488, 501 [122 
SThe Attorney General relies on our statement that "The record im-
ports absolute verity .... " (In re Oonnor (1940) 16 Cal.2d 701; 708 
[108 P.2d 10].) That statement, however, was preceded by the observa· 
tion that "There is nothing ... in the method shown to have been 
employed in prevaring the record, or in any .other matter brought out by 
petitioner, which would cast a doubt upon the verity and authenticity of 
the [record]." (In re Oonnor, supra, 16 CaI.2d at pp. 707-708.) The court 
then proceeded to determine from all the available information that peti· 
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[68 C.2d 762; 69 Cal.Rptr. 93, 441 P.2d 933) 
P.2d 22) ; Haacks v. Wainwright (5th Cir. 1968) 387 F.2d 
176,179.) 
[6] The Attorney General contends that petitioner's fail-
ure to challenge the validity of the prior convictions at an 
earlier time precludes his doing so on habeas corpus. "\Ve held 
in In re Woods, supra, 64 Cal.2d 3, In re Luce, supra, 64 
Cal.2d 11, and In re Tucker, supra, 64 Ca1.2d 15, that habeas 
corpus would lie to attack the constitutional validity of 
foreign prior convictions. The Attorney General points out 
that the petitioners in those cases attacked state convictions 
whose unconstitutionality was determined in 1963 in Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 83 S.Ct. 792, 93 
A.L.R.2d 733], after the petitioners' California convictions 
were entered (see In re Woods, supra, at pp. 7-8), whereas 
federal courts were required to appoint counsel for indigents 
since 1938 (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. 458), before 
petitioner was convicted. 
It is true that defendants must ordinarily raise a constitu-
tional issue by a pretrial motion to strike the prior convic-
tion from the information or indictment, or by entering a 
plea denying the prior conviction. (People v. Coffey, supra, 
67 Ca1.2d 204, 215, 217.) Petitioner's failure to pursue these 
remedies, however, could not constitute a wa'iver of the right 
to a hearing in this case, for at the time of his California 
conviction in 1959, we had not yet made it clear that defend-
ants could offer extrinsic evidence to disprove facts recited in 
official records of conviction or to prove that an incomplete 
record masks violatIons of constitutional rights.s Moreover, 
to find a waiver in these circumstances would unduly restrict 
the right to relief from a substantial increase in punishment 
based on a constitutionally invalid conviction.10 
9Prior to the Wooas, Luce, and Tucker cases, we limited our examina· 
tion of foreign convictions to consider whether the foreign crime fit one 
of the categories established by Penal Code section 644 for the purpose 
of determining habitual criminality (In re McVic7cel's (1946) 29 Cal.2d 
264, 278·279 [176 P.2d 40]) and to determine whether the rendering 
court had jurisdiction to try the defendant. (See In re WOlfson (1947) 
30 Cal.2d 20, 31 [180 P.2d 326].) That a factual hearing may .be appro-
priate and permissible to establish constitutional infirmities did not be-
come clear until 1966 when the Wooas, Luce, and Tucker cases were 
decided. 
lOThe fact that petitioner's prior convictions were entered upon pleas 
of guilty of course does not prcclude his contcnding that he did not have 
nor waive the assistance of counsel. (Rice v. Olson (1945) 324 U.S. 786, 
788-789 [89 L.Ed. 1367, 1369-1370, 65 8.Ct. 989].) The prior convictions 
that we permitted petitioners to attack in the Woods, Luce, and Tucker 
cases, for example, were entered upon pleas of guilty. (See also In re 
Johnaon (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325, 333-334 [42 Cal.Rptr. 228,398 P.2d 420].) 
) 
) 
The writ is granted and the Superior Court of the County 
of San Francisco is directed to redetermine petitioner's sen-
tence in People v. Caffey (S.F. Superior Court No. 55643) in 
accordance with thc views expressed herein. The question we 
have reserved of the constitutionality of the federal statutes 
can thereafter be reviewed,. if necessary, on appeal from the 
trial court's order resentencing petitioner. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., eoncurred. 
